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A commentary on
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by Sevos, J., Grosselin, A., Brouillet, D., Pellet, J., and Massoubre, C. (2016). Front. Psychol. 7:1551.
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In their recent article, Sevos et al. (2016) present data indicating that subjects with schizophrenia
“have an impaired ability to experience an internal simulation of motor action potentialities when
they perceived graspable objects” (p. 12). This lack of sensorimotor facilitation in patients with
schizophrenia aligns broadly with other patient studies, and indicates that such individuals would
require extensive use of higher cognitive processes even for the simplest routine activities in their
daily life. A solid conclusion from this data would be certainly informative to understand the
specific mechanisms behind schizophrenia.
The purpose of this commentary is to raise a point for further discussion. The claim that patients
with schizophrenia lack this sensorimotor facilitation is based upon two non-significant effects
reported in Experiments 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016). This is problematic, though, since the
traditional null-hypothesis testing approach does not allow one to “accept” a null hypothesis. This
is because the p-value represents the probability of obtaining a sample statistic at least as large as
that obtained from a given sample, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. If this p-value is small,
we reject the null hypothesis on the grounds that an obtained sample statistic occurs with such low
probability that the underlying null hypothesis should be considered implausible. If the p-value is
not small, our only decision is to “fail to reject” the null hypothesis. It is important to note that this
procedure only results in a decision to either reject or fail to reject; it does not provide any measure
of evidence in favor of either the null or alternative hypothesis.
One common approach to help mitigate this problem is to report power. Mathematically, a test
with sufficient power is less likely to produce a Type II error, and this allows one to feel somewhat
assured that reported null effects are not simply false negatives. Though better than nothing, this
approach still does not give any direct measure of evidence supporting an obtained null effect.
However, recent methods based on Bayesian inference (Wagenmakers, 2007; Rouder et al., 2009)
provide a relatively easy solution to this problem.
Though the specifics of Bayesian inference are beyond the scope of this short commentary
(see Wagenmakers, 2007 for more details), the basic idea is that one computes a Bayes factor to
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index the preference for one model over another. The larger the
Bayes factor, the more evidence in support of the model. One
particular advantage to this approach is that it allows a researcher
to directly assess evidence in support of the null hypothesis
H0 over another hypothesis H1; such a Bayes factor would be
denoted BF01. This Bayes factor represents the odds in favor
of the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis after the
data have been observed. Further, BF01 can be converted into
a posterior probability, which is the probability that the null
hypothesis H0 is true given data D.
To this end, we will describe how to compute BF01 and
the posterior probabilities for the null effects reported in
Experiments 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016).
The first step in the computation is estimating the Bayes factor
BF01. Following Wagenmakers (2007), Masson (2011) describes
one approach to estimating BF01 that is based on the Bayesian
Information Criterion, or BIC. BF01 is estimated as
BF01 ∼ e
(1BIC/2) (1)
where
1BIC = n ln(1− η2p)+ (k1 − k0) ln(n). (2)
In Equation (2), n represents the number of subjects, η2p is the
standard effect size measure in an ANOVA which represents
the proportion of variance accounted for by the independent
variable, and k1 − k0 represents the difference in the number of
free parameters between the two models being compared. Note
that in the case of a comparison between a null and alternative
hypothesis for a single two-level factor (i.e., prime, present vs.
absent), k1 − k0 = 1. Finally, if we assume that the null and
alternative hypothesis are equally likely before collecting data
(that is, equal priors), the Bayes factor B01 can be converted into
a posterior probability estimate via the equation:
p(H0|D) =
BF01
BF01 + 1
. (3)
Now, let us compute Bayes factors for the reported null effects in
Experiment 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016). In Experiment 1, the
authors reported that for the n = 18 patients with schizophrenia,
the critical interaction of response and orientation did not differ
as a function of name prime (present vs. absent), F(1, 17) = 2.584,
p = 0.126, η2p = 0.13. Equation (2) yields
1BIC = n ln(1− η2p)+ (k1 − k0) ln(n)
= 18 ln(1− 0.13)+ (1) ln(18)
= 0.384.
Substituting this into Equation (1) then gives us the estimate
BF01 ∼ e
(1BIC/2)
= e(0.384/2)
= 1.211.
This means that, given the data, a null interaction is only 1.21
times more likely than a true interaction between response and
orientation. According to Jeffreys (1961), Bayes factors falling
between 1 and 3 are considered “anecdotal” evidence, whereas a
Bayes factor between 3 and 10 represents “moderate” evidence,
and a Bayes factor greater than 10 is considered “strong”
evidence. As such, the evidence from Sevos et al. (2016) is
anecdotal.
Additionally, we can use Equation (3) to compute the
posterior probability of the null hypothesis:
p(H0|D) =
BF01
BF01 + 1
=
1.211
1.211+ 1
= 0.55.
According to Masson (2011), probability values falling between
0.50 and 0.75 are taken as weak evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis. As the Bayes factor and posterior probability are
directly related via Equation (3), they both tell the same story; that
is, the null effect of name prime reported in Sevos et al. (2016) is
not well supported.
A similar computation can be carried out for the effect
of action prime in Experiment 2. Sevos et al. (2016) report
that for a group of n = 18 patients with schizophrenia, the
interaction between response and orientation did not differ
as a function of action prime (congruent vs. incongruent),
F(1, 17) = 1.288, p = 0.272, η
2
p = 0.07. Applying Equation
(2) gives 1BIC = 1.584, which implies (via Equation 1) that
BF01 ∼ 2.208, implying that the null interaction is only 2.21 times
more likely than the true interaction. Equation 3 yields a posterior
probability of p(H0|D) = 0.69. As with Experiment 1, evidence
for this null effect is weak.
It is worth noting that this method is not the only approach
to computing Bayes factors to assess null effects. The software
package JASP (available as a free download from www.jasp-
stats.org) contains a Summary Stats module that allows the
user to compute Bayes factors from test statistics for a variety
of common designs, including t-tests and linear regression. At
present, the Summary Stats module does not have an option for
ANOVA designs, in which case themethod ofMasson (2011) that
we have presented provides a good solution. One should also note
that Bayes factors and posterior probabilities can be computed
directly from raw data using JASP or the BayesFactor package
(Morey and Rouder, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2016).
In summary, a Bayesian analysis of these two results indicates
that at present, there is not much support for the null effects
reported in Experiments 1 and 2. As such, any interpretations
of these null effects should be met with caution. It is important
to note that the points raised in this commentary are not
meant to be unfairly critical of the results obtained by Sevos
et al. (2016). On the contrary, the experiments are well-designed
and informative, both in the context of embodied cognition as
well as in the context of psychopathology. The purpose of this
commentary was (1) to point out the issues that are present when
trying to interpret nonsignificant results in the traditional null
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hypothesis statistical testing framework, and (2) to offer a quick
example of how to use a Bayesian approach to quantify evidence
for object-affordance effects and other action-specific influences
on perception in the study of embodied cognition.
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